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Abstract. Bayesian methods since the time of Laplace have been understood by their 
practitioners as closely aligned to the scientific method. Indeed a recent champion of Bayesian 
methods, E. T. Jaynes, titled his textbook on the subject Probability Theory: the Logic of 
Science. Many philosophers of science including Karl Popper and Donald Campbell have 
interpreted the evolution of Science as a Darwinian process consisting of a 'copy with selective 
retention' algorithm abstracted from Darwin's theory of Natural Selection. Arguments are 
presented for an isomorphism between Bayesian Methods and Darwinian processes. Universal 
Darwinism, as the term has been developed by Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and Susan 
Blackmore, is the collection of  scientific theories which explain the creation and evolution of 
their subject matter as due to the operation of Darwinian processes. These subject matters span 
the fields of atomic physics, chemistry, biology and the social sciences. The principle of 
Maximum Entropy states that systems will evolve to states of highest entropy subject to the 
constraints of scientific law. This principle may be inverted to provide illumination as to the 
nature of scientific law. Our best cosmological theories suggest the universe contained much less 
complexity during the period shortly after the Big Bang than it does at present. The scientific 
subject matter of atomic physics, chemistry, biology and the social sciences has been created 
since that time. An explanation is proposed for the existence of this subject matter as due to the 
evolution of constraints in the form of adaptations imposed on Maximum Entropy. It is argued 
these adaptations were discovered and instantiated through the operations of a succession of 
Darwinian processes. 
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ITRODUCTIO 
Darwin understood that the algorithmic nature of natural selection suggested that its 
abstraction might be useful to the study of the evolution of other processes such as 
language. Darwinian processes, (where evolution of some subject matter is described 
as embodying three steps: replication, variation and differential selection) are now 
used as the essential explanatory mechanism in numerous fields of study in biological 
and social sciences such as population genetics, evolutionary epistemology, 
evolutionary psychology, evolutionary archaeology, memetics and  evolutionary 
linguistics. The term Universal Darwinism has come to be applied to the collection of 
scientific theories utilizing Darwinian processes as their essential explanatory model 
(Dawkins, 1976; Blackmore, 1995; Dennett, 1995). 
Prominent philosophers of science including Karl Popper and Donald Campbell 
have founded the active the field of Evolutionary Epistemology, the evolution of 
systems of knowledge (including science), in terms of a Darwinian process (Popper, 
1972; Campbell, 1965). 
In this light the evolution of Science might be considered in terms of copies of 
existing theories being made in scientists' minds, often with variations from the 
original. Those variations that experience preferential survival are those that are best 
supported by the data. 
Of course ‘best supported by the data’ is a measure supplied by Bayesian methods. 
Indeed E.T. Jaynes dubbed Bayesian probability 'the logic of science'. (Jaynes, 2003). 
Karl Friston and others, of the Bayesian Brain school of neuroscience, have 
developed a theory of mind which models aspects of  mental processes as near optimal 
Bayesian mechanisms that update mental models from experience (Friston, 2007).  
Given that the brain has evolved over hundreds of millions of years, through natural 
selection, to gather knowledge and guide effective actions in the world, we are led to 
the observation that the Bayesian process of updating knowledge was discovered long 
before the existence of Science or even of human beings.  Indeed this observation 
suggests that the Darwinian/Bayesian mechanism of knowledge evolution is a truly 
ancient and time tested strategy and, contrary to the view of post modernists, is of a 
different stature from other cultural accounts such as myths or religion. 
In view of the homology between Darwinian and Bayesian mechanisms apparent in 
the evolution of Science, Section One will examine the abstract nature of Darwinian 
processes postulated to be operating by various theories included within universal 
Darwinism and will explore their Bayesian nature. 
The history of the universe has involved the creation and evolution of systems 
possessing greater complexity over time. Much of scientific subject matter is 
composed of levels of complexity created and evolved since the time of the Big Bang 
including atomic physics, chemistry, biology and culture.  It is something of a puzzle 
that while the history of the universe conforms to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics 
many objects of scientific interest in the universe have managed to defy this overall 
trend and maintain their existence in states of low entropy. 
The principle of Maximum Entropy tells us that systems will always evolve to 
states of higher entropy unless they are constrained by scientific law to do otherwise. 
It follows that systems will only maintain low entropy states if they are constrained to 
do so by scientific law. Section Two makes the argument that insight into the nature of 
scientific law might be gained through an understanding of the processes by which 
these constraints were created and evolved. 
In the Discussion a recent theory from physics is examined that holds some promise 
of extending this paradigm to areas of scientific subject matter more fundamental than 
those of biology and culture. 
Darwinian Processes and Bayesian Methods 
The algorithmic nature of natural selection allows its essential mechanism to be 
abstracted and hypothesized as a possible mechanism operating in the evolution of 
subject matter often other than biological. Numerous theories of this type abound in 
the social sciences and even in the hard sciences such as physics.    
The essential abstraction from natural selection, which we are calling a Darwinian 
process, has been developed in the work of Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett and 
Susan Blackmore (amongst others) to consist of a three-step process: 
1) Replication of system. 
2) Inheritance of some characteristics that have variation amongst the offspring. 
3) Differential survival of the offspring according to which variable characteristics 
they possess. 
It has been proposed that any system adhering to this three-step algorithm, 
regardless of its substrate, must evolve and will evolve in the direction of an increased 
ability to survive (Dawkins, 1976; Dennett, 1995; Blackmore, 1995). 
Offspring that inherit a slate of characteristics providing them with a substantial 
survival advantage will have greater reproductive success than their competitors. 
Characteristics that bestow greater survivability are called adaptations. Adaptations 
are usually discovered through processes with a random 'trial and error' component, 
such as genetic mutation, but the greater survivability they bestow allows them to 
become widespread within the population. Systems with long evolutionary histories 
come to accumulate many adaptations. Indeed any organism may be considered as 
largely an accumulation of adaptations built up over evolutionary time. 
Survival of a complex system is only allowed by the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics 
if exchanges with the system's environment are achieved such that the entropy of the 
system is maintained or decreased to an extent more than made up for by the increase 
in environmental entropy. For instance the strategy of photosynthesis in green plants 
to improve their survivability (through an intricate process that transfers free energy 
from photons in the environment to a chemical form of energy usable by the plant) is 
dependent on an overall increase in entropy in the sun/earth system. 
Survivability of complex systems thus depends on finding loopholes where 
environmental entropy increase can be used to decrease system entropy. In this sense 
adaptations are highly tuned to their environments and may be considered to model 
their environments. Henry Plotkin (1997 p.116) has argued that adaptations can be 
considered the knowledge of specific methods used by low entropy systems to 
maintain or decrease their entropy at the expense of their environments. 
Bayesian probability is often defined as a measure of a state of knowledge. It is the 
degree of belief we should have in a proposition given the data available to us. It is a 
subjective measure in the sense that it is dependent on the evidence available to a 
given observer and may differ between observers or with a given observer over time. 
However it is objective in the sense that a unique probability should be calculated by 
all observers having the same evidence (Jaynes, 2003, pp. 44-45). 
This objective nature of Bayesian probability precludes it from applying solely to 
the conscious minds of human observers engaged in cultural systems of knowledge 
such as Science. We should expect the principles of Bayesian probability to be 
followed by any system having internal models of external reality that are updated 
through experiences if those models are to be maintained in a near-optimal manner. 
A central theme running through E.T. Jaynes’ great text book on Bayesian 
probability concerns the necessary design of any robot capable of plausible reasoning. 
His conclusion is that such a robot can only be designed according to the principles of 
Bayesian probability (Jaynes, 2003). Any system of knowledge that must be updated 
to model changes in its environment or to model greater details of its environment is 
performing inference, and Bayesian probability is the unique method of performing 
such inference (Jaynes, 1986). 
Karl Friston has argued that any adaptive system must contain internal models of its 
environment. He argues that the accuracy of these models in characterizing their 
environments is maintained by Bayesian processes that update the models through 
inference from data. Friston has proposed a method of understanding many aspects of 
cortical organization and response that he has called the free energy principle. It 
suggests that organisms attempt to minimize discrepancies (surprises) between their 
internal models and actual events in the environment (Friston, 2007). The Bayesian 
Brain School has produced a substantial body of research suggesting that Bayesian 
processes operate at the core of many unconscious mental functions to update internal 
models in a manner that keeps them in sync with their environments (Friston, 2007). 
As Friston notes, the price of experiencing surprise may often be death. 
The mechanics of updating models in a Bayesian manner when new data becomes 
available might be understood as forming an algorithmic process: 
1) Copies of the competing models brought forward along with the relevant prior 
data. 
2) Variations in likelihoods amongst the competing models as provided by new 
data in accordance with Bayes' Theorem. 
3) Differential survival of competing models according to their Bayesian 
likelihood. 
 
It can be argued that this algorithm is isomorphic to the algorithm underlying 
Darwinian processes. 
If we consider the range of scientific subject matter that might be included within 
this Darwinian/Bayesian framework of adaptive systems we should consider Science 
itself, the many branches of social science with 'Evolutionary' in their titles (such as 
Evolutionary Psychology), many aspect of behavioural and neuroscience and of course 
most fields of biology involving natural selection. 
The primary knowledge model employed by all organisms is coded in their genetics 
and expressed in their phenotypes. The adaptations composing an organism form a 
detailed model of what is expected in their environment and how to respond to this 
environment in a manner facilitating survival. At the level of population genetics the 
composition of a population's genetics is determined by generational transformations 
largely mediated through natural selection (Lewontin, 1974).  These transformations 
serve to maintain a close fit between the model inherent in the population's genome 
and characteristics exhibited by the population's environment.   
The genetic plan retained at any given time is selected on the basis of the 
adaptations produced in the phenotype. Adaptations encapsulate knowledge of the 
environment, specifically knowledge of how to survive in the particular environment 
in which the organism expects to find itself (Plotkin, 1997). If we accept a definition 
of inference as 'conclusions drawn logically from premises' and perhaps limit the usual 
meanings of 'premises' and 'conclusions' to 'facts revealed by experience' and 'models 
derived from experience' then we might view natural selection's selective retention of 
adaptations as analogous to updating of knowledge through inference.  
Bayesian theory tells us that there is only one mathematically sound method of 
updating the plausibility of models. That method is Bayes' Theorem (Jaynes 2003). 
Thus we should expect, to the extent that a population's genomic model 
  
 
 
 
 
maintains a close fit to its environment, that this updating is accomplished through 
mechanisms analogous to Bayesian methods. 
Since the mid-twentieth century many new fields have been introduced to the social 
sciences which employ Darwinian processes as explanations for the creation and 
evolution of their subject matter. These include evolutionary psychology, evolutionary 
linguistics, evolutionary archaeology, evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary 
sociology and evolutionary economics. These disciplines often borrow  theoretical 
constructs directly from evolutionary biology. For instance a number of fields have 
adopted the biological method of cladistics, with only minor alterations. As an 
example Evolutionary Archeology uses cladistics in the study of artifact evolution 
such as arrowhead design (O'Brien, 2003). In these scenarios cultural artifacts are 
understood as cultural adaptations which have evolved. 
Besides applying the Darwinian process to explain evolution of specific cultural 
entities, theories have also proposed Darwinian processes to be responsible for the 
overall emergence and evolution of culture itself. Two of the most developed are the 
Dual Inheritance theory (Henrich, 2007) and Memetics (Blackmore, 1995). 
Within Universal Darwinism theories have in common the supposition that the 
knowledge structures of their subject matter are created and evolve through the 
operation of Darwinian processes. This knowledge exists in the form of adaptations 
that increase survivability and are passed between generations.  
  
Maximum Entropy and Evolution 
The principle of Maximum Entropy predicts that a system will evolve to a state of 
highest entropy available, subject to constraints in the form of prior information 
applicable to the system. The constraint often represents our knowledge in the form of 
scientific law (Jaynes, 1985). In fact scientific law might be viewed as generalized 
principles that have been derived from prior information. 
The second law is widely recognized as providing perhaps the most fundamental 
framework for the evolution of the universe. Yet when we view the actual evolution of 
the universe as revealed by our best scientific theories there is an apparent paradox. 
The scope of scientific subject matter near the time of the Big Bang was limited but 
since that time there have occurred successive introductions of new low-entropy 
subject matter including atomic physics, chemistry, biology and culture. All of these 
complex systems operate in accordance with the second law but they appear to exploit 
loopholes in order to maintain their local low entropy status. 
Thermodynamic entropy in this context should be defined as the constrained 
maximum of –k Tr(p ln p) over all density matrices of the macrovariables considered 
(Jaynes, 1992). Thus macrovariables such as temperature impose constraints on 
FIGURE 1. A schematic for adaptive systems containing internal models of their 
environments that are inferred, through Bayesian methods, from prior data. These models 
are tested by new data or experience in the environment and updated when surprised. 
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entropy. Jaynes wrote that he could only give an answer to questions regarding the 
possibility of biological systems violating the second law if the variables regarding the 
thermodynamic state of the system were completely defined (Jaynes, 1965). For 
biological systems those variables would, for example, include complexities such as 
numerous enzymes operating in the cell serving to constrain the probability of various 
chemical pathways occurring and thereby constraining the entropy of the system. 
The principle of Maximum Entropy tells us that the failure of complex systems that 
make up the bulk of scientific subject matter to evolve to states of higher entropy is 
due to scientific law. It is apparent that scientific law has accumulated over the course 
of time along with the creation of scientific subject matter. Within biology it is a near 
consensus that this accumulation is due to natural selection. Numerous theories within 
the social sciences also explain the creation and evolution of the low entropy states 
composing their subject matter as due to the operation of Darwinian processes. 
Prior knowledge, as used by the principle of Maximum Entropy, is not only a 
subjective attribute of the researcher's mind. To provide useful results it must 
encapsulate all pertinent constraints actually occuring in nature. Indeed experimental 
results that do not agree with the predictions of Maximum Entropy indicate the 
researcher is missing pertinent prior knowledge (Jaynes, 2003, p. 371).    
Thus, prior knowledge or scientific law, which forms constraints on Maximum 
Entropy, is an attribute of objective reality and one that has evolved during the history 
of the universe. An understanding of how such constraints were created and 
transformed may have been most thoroughly developed within biology where it forms 
the subject matter of evolutionary biology. 
It is proposed that much of scientific law or prior knowledge may be understood as 
generalizations of those designs that are capable of maintaining local states of low 
entropy. These designs although being rare within the space of all possible designs 
have become widely distributed in reality due to their discovery and propagation by 
Darwinian processes. It is suggested that much of scientific subject matter is the 
accumulated adaptations discovered over evolutionary history by Darwinian 
processes. 
Theories within Universal Darwinism describing the evolution of their subject 
matter in terms of information accumulated through the operation of Darwinian 
processes are closely aligned to the Principle of Maximum Entropy as they may 
explain the creation and evolution of constraints central to Maximum Entropy. 
Discussion 
The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences has seemed 
something of a wonder to many researchers (Wigner, 1960). Why is mathematics so 
powerful in describing natural processes? Max Tegmark (2009) has offered a solution 
that may appear somewhat obvious, suggesting that physical reality is isomorphic to a 
mathematical structure which we are gradually discovering. 
Bayesian probability may well lay claim to be the 'logic of science', given that it is 
the unique mathematical structure providing a valid extension of logic to areas of 
incomplete knowledge where degrees of plausibility must be dealt with (Jaynes, 2003, 
p. xx). Science is one such structure. However this claim may be extended to areas of 
the natural world where structures containing knowledge have evolved. Gaining 
knowledge requires logical inference which operates according to Bayesian principles.  
Outside of the realm of biology and the social science lies much of reality that also 
persists in states of low entropy, notably atomic physics and chemistry. These states 
seem to owe their persistence as low-entropy entities directly to scientific law. 
Some researchers, inspired by quantum computation, view the universe itself as a 
quantum computer based on the observation that the fundamental force laws of 
physics and their mediated interactions may be interpreted as quantum computations. 
The outcomes of the interactions are the results of the computations (Lloyd, 2007). 
Some biologists are also calling for a more information-centric focus to their subject 
(Brenner, 1999).  We might expect that these endeavors, concerned with information 
and inference, will be informed by Bayesian methods and Darwinian processes.   
Discovery of scientific laws might be most complete in the fields of physics and 
chemistry where constraints on entropy production are perhaps of a simpler design, 
their operation being quantum. It may seem highly unlikely that these constraints were 
also discovered through the action of Darwinian processes. Unfortunately there is 
currently a shortage of interpretations of quantum processes that are explanatory in the 
usual sense. Indeed Richard Feynman (1967) famously remarked that 'no one 
understands quantum mechanics'. 
This barrier to understanding, existing for nearly a century, may have recently been 
breached. Wojciech Zurek, of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and collaborators 
have proposed a resolution to the primary point of misunderstanding known as 'the 
measurement problem'. Central to this resolution is a theory they have named 
Quantum Darwinism. Quantum Darwinism portrays quantum interactions in terms of a 
Darwinian process where information is copied from the quantum system to its 
environment. According to this theory only a limited subset of available information 
can survive the transfer and forms the 'classical' reality we witness and are composed 
of, a reality that is selected, in a Darwinian manner, from the vast array of quantum 
potentialities (Zurek, 2009). 
It remains to be seen if Quantum Darwinism can be successfully interpreted in a 
manner portraying the complexities of atomic physics and chemistry as adaptations 
discovered by Quantum Darwinism and following Bayesian principles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKOWLEDGMETS 
I would like to thank Karen Drysdale, Mac Campbell, Ry Glover and Michael 
Skrigitil for lively and enjoyable discussions. 
REFERECES 
1. Blackmore, S. (1995). The Meme Machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2. Brenner, S. (1999). Theoretical Biology In The Third Millennium. Philosophical 
Transactions: Biological Sciences, Vol 354, o 1392 . 
3. Campbell, D. (1965). Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution. In G. I. 
Herbert R. Barringer, Social change in developing areas: A reinterpretation of evolutionary 
theory (pp. 19-49). Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman. 
4. Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
5. Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin's Dangerous Idea. New York: Touchstone Publishing. 
6. Feynman, R. (1967). The Character of Physical Law. M.I.T. Press. 
7. Friston, K. (2007). Free Energy and the Brain. Synthese , 159: 417-458. 
8. Henrich, J. a. (2007). Dual Inheritance Theory: The Evolution of Human Cultural Capacities 
and Cultural Evolution. In e. b. Barrett, Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. Oxford 
University Press. 
9. Jaynes, E. (1986). Bayesian Methods: General Background. In J. H. (ed.), (174Kb),' in 
Maximum-Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Applied Statistics. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press. 
10. Jaynes, E. (1965). Gibbs vs Boltzmann Entropies. Am. J. Phys. , 391. 
11. Jaynes, E. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
12. Jaynes, E. (1992). The Gibbs Paradox. In P. N. G. Erickson, Maximum-Entropy and Bayesian 
Methods. Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
13. Jaynes, E. (1985). Where do we go from Here? In J.C. R. Smith and W. T. Grandy, Maximum-
Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Inverse Problems (p. p. 21 ). 
14. Lewontin, R. C. (1974). The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change. Columbia University 
Press. 
15. Lloyd, S. (2007). Programming the Universe. Vintage. 
16. O'Brien, M. J. (2003). Resolving Phylogeny: Evolutionary Archaeology's Fundamental Issue. 
In T. L. VanPool, Essential Tensions in Archaeological Method and Theory, (pp. 115-135). 
Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. 
17. Plotkin, H. (1997). Darwin Machines and the ature of Knowledge. Cambridge, 
Massachusettes: Harvard University Press. 
18. Popper, K. (1972). Objective Knowledge . Clarendon Press. 
19. S.Kirby, M. (2003). Language Evolution. New York: Oxford University Press. 
20. Tegmark, M. (2009). The Mathematical Universe. Foundations of Physics 38 , 101-50. . 
21. Wigner, E. (1960). The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. 
Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 13 , 1–14. 
22. Zurek, W. (2009). Quantum Darwinism. ature Physics, vol. 5 , pp. 181-188 . 
 
